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 Abstract 
A utilitarian social planner who maximizes social welfare assigns the available 
income to those who are most efficient in converting income into utility. However, 
when individuals are concerned about their income falling behind the incomes of 
others, the optimal income distribution under utilitarianism is equality of incomes.  
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1. Introduction  
In this short paper we present the first result that we obtained when we studied 
the tension between utilitarianism (conceptualizing social welfare as the sum of the 
individuals’ utilities) and egalitarianism (cherishing equality between individuals). In 
contrast with the received literature that pits the two as competing social objectives, 
we show that when the maximization of social welfare takes into account individuals’ 
concern about low relative income, there is no difference between a utilitarian income 
allocation distribution and an egalitarian income distribution; the two align. 
  For a good many years now, an effort has been made to season utilitarianism 
with egalitarian gravy. Prominent economists as early as Marshall (1823) and Pigou 
(1920) defended utilitarianism as a guide to the maximization of social welfare. The 
argument made was that the maximization of the sum of individual utilities requires 
equalization of marginal utilities. However, equating marginal utilities is equivalent to 
equating incomes only under a very special assumption of identical utility functions. 
In general, a utilitarian social planner will not choose to distribute incomes equally. 
Still, utilitarianism was  applied  in  evaluating  income inequality (Dalton, 1920; 
Tinbergen, 1970). In other words, utilitarianism was the launch pad for assessing 
inequality from a welfarist standpoint. This stand was criticized by Sen (1973, p. 18): 
“It seems fairly clear that fundamentally utilitarianism is very far from an egalitarian 
approach.” Pattanaik (2009) voiced a similar criticism. In what follows we show that 
once individuals’ concern for low relative income is factored in, the utilitarian rule 
and the egalitarian approach are fundamentally the same. 
  Evidence from econometric studies, experimental economics, social 
psychology, and neuroscience indicates that humans  routinely  engage in inter-
personal comparisons, and that the outcome of that engagement impinges on their 
sense of wellbeing. People are dismayed when their consumption, income, or social 
standing fall below those of others with whom they naturally compare themselves 
(those who constitute their “comparison group”). Examples of responses to such 
dismay include Stark and Taylor (1991), Zizzo and Oswald, (2001), Luttmer (2005), 
Fliessbach et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), Takahashi et al. (2009), 
Stark and Fan (2011), Stark and Hyll (2011), Fan and Stark (2011), and Stark, Hyll, 
and Wang (2011).   2 
Taking total income as given, we show that when individuals care only about 
their absolute income, the maximization of a social welfare function that sums up the 
individuals’ utilities mandates allocating the available income such that the individual 
who values income more ends up receiving more income than the individual who 
values income less. This result is trivial, and, of course, is well-known. However, 
when individuals care  also  about trailing behind  others  in the income hierarchy 
(exhibit a concern for relative deprivation),  the  maximization of a social welfare 
function that sums up the individuals’ utilities (with these utilities incorporating the 
said concern) mandates income equalization. This is anything but trivial. Apparently, 
relative  income  concerns elevate equalization of incomes to the “status” of the 
optimal societal scheme.  
In  the next section we present our core argument for the case of two 
individuals. In our more comprehensive paper (Stark, Kobus, and Jakubek, 2011) we 
prove the robustness of the result reported here along several dimensions: we provide 
an extension of our argument to the case of any  2 n ≥  individuals; we revert to a more 
general specification of the weights of absolute income and relative deprivation in the 
individuals’ utility functions;  and  we  show that  our  result  is not confined  to a 
particular utility specification in which the preference concerning absolute income is 
characterized by a linear function. In section 3 we offer our conclusions.  
2. The tension between utilitarianism and income equality forgone: 
the case of two individuals 
Let there be a society that consists of two individuals: “I1” with incomex1, 
and “I2” with income  x2 , such that x1 + x2 =1 and  12 ,0 x x ≥ . The utility function of 
“I1” is  α = 1 11 ux ,  1 0 α > , and the utility function of “I2” is  α = 2 22 ux ,  2 0 α > .  
Let there be a social planner who, by means of allocating a unit of income 
between the two individuals, seeks to maximize social welfare, SWF, where social 
welfare is the sum of utilities:  1 21 2 12 ( )( ( ,) ) SWF x u x u x x = + . Using a star to indicate 
optimal values, if  αα > 12  then 
*
1 1 x =  and 
*
2 0 x = ; and if  αα > 21  then 
*
1 0 x =  and 
*
2 1 x = :  the individual who is more “productive” in converting income into utility   3 
receives the entire available income.
1
*
2 1 x =
 Put differently, regardless of the magnitudes of 
the weights that the two individuals attach to (absolute) income and as long as those 
magnitudes differ one from the other, social welfare maximization is orthogonal to 
income equality. In sum: when for all levels of the available income I2 is more 
“productive” in converting income to utility than I1 then, regardless of the initial 
distribution of income,   and 
*
1 0 x = . 
Consider an alternative setting in which individuals I1 and I2 have, 
respectively, the following utility functions:  
{ } 21
1 11 1 11 1 1
max ,0
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
2
xx
u xx R D xx αα αα
−
= −− = −−  
and 
{ } 12
2 22 2 22 2 2
max ,0
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
2
xx
u xx R D xx αα αα
−
= −− = −− , 
where  12 ( , ), x xx =  α1,α2 ∈(0,1), and the measure of the concern for relative income, 
() i RD x  for  {1, 2} i∈ , is the index of “relative deprivation,” based on the seminal work 
of Runciman (1966), and proposed by Yitzhaki (1979).
2 () i RD x  The   index can be 
shown (see, for example, Stark, 2010) to be equal to the fraction of the individuals in 
the population whose incomes are higher than the income of the individual, times 
their mean excess income.  
The social planner thus maximizes 
{ } { }
12
21 12
11 1 22 2 ,
1 12 2
max ,0 max ,0
max[ (1 ) (1 ) ]
22










or, since x2 =1− x1,  
                                                 
1 If  12 αα = , then any distribution is optimal. 
2 Below we show, however, that our argument does not hinge on measuring the concern for relative 
income by this particular index.    4 
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Constrain first the range of  1 x ,  such that  1 1/2 x ≤ .  Then,  the  problem 
simplifies to  
1
1
11 1 2 1
1
12
max[ (1 ) (1 )]
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x x
x
α αα − −− +
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Because the function to be maximized is linear with respect to  1 x  and has a positive 
slope 1−α2, the solution is 
*
1 1/2 x =  which, together with x2 =1− x1, implies that 
*
2 1/2 x = . This result obtains regardless of the specific magnitudes of α1,α2 ∈(0,1). 
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Since the maximized function is linear with a negative slope ( ) 1 1 α − , it attains its 
maximum for the smallest possible value of the argument, that is, at 
*
1 1/2 x = . 
  Summing up:  in  both cases we have that the solution is 
*
1 1/2 x =   which, 
together with x2 =1− x1, implies that 
*
2 1/2 x = ; namely, optimal social welfare is 
achieved when incomes are equal. Again, this result obtains regardless of the specific 
magnitudes of α1,α2 ∈(0,1).  
Moreover, the result of an equal division of income is robust to alternative 
specifications of the dismay that I1 senses on account of his income falling below the 





disutility weight  1 (1 ) α −  is attached to  21 () xx − ; it is merely the excess income, not 
the fraction of those in the population whose income is higher times the mean excess 
income, that measures the dismay. Then, the social planner maximizes 
( )
12
11 1 2 1 22 ,
12 12
max[ (1 ) ]
s.t.   1; 0







or, since x2 =1− x1,  
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11 1 1 1 2 1
11
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x x xx x
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or, equivalently  
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Since  12 20 αα −−> , the maximizing  value is 
*
1 1/2 x = .  Because  this result is   6 
independent of the specific magnitudes of α1,α2 ∈(0,1), the case  21 xx ≤  is symmetric 
to the case discussed above. 
Alternatively, let the coefficient  1 (1 ) α −  be attached to the distance from mean 












−= , we get  the same 
representation as the one that we started with. 
Furthermore, it so happens that even when I2 derives positive utility from being 
better off than I1, the concern of I1 for relative income renders equality the best social 
outcome if  21 αα > . Imagine then the following utility function of I2: 
2 22 2 2 1 ( ) (1 )( ) ux x x x αα = +− − , 
while, as before, the utility function of I1 is 
1 11 1 2 1 ( ) (1 )( ) ux x x x αα = −− − . 
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or, since x2 =1− x1,  
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11
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or, equivalently,  
1
11 1 2 2 1 2 2
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3 In comparison with the first configuration where we obtain the same result when  1 0 1/2 x ≤≤  as 
when  1 1/2 1 x ≤≤   (that is, when  12 xx ≤   as when  12 xx ≥ ) here, without loss of generality, we 
additionally assume that  12 xx ≤ .    7 













Thus, if I1 cares more about relative income than I2, namely if  12 11 αα − >−  which is 
the same as having  21 0 αα −> , equality once again is the socially optimal outcome. 
Comment: can it be that our result is simply a consequence of us assuming that 
“beginning from an egalitarian outcome, the marginal gain to a richer person is higher 
than the marginal loss felt by a poorer person?” Not so, and for the simple reason that 
increasing the income of the individual who is the most “efficient” in terms of 
converting income to utility yields only a seemingly higher “marginal gain.” To see 
this most vividly, let us indeed begin from “an egalitarian outcome” in a population in 
which each of two individuals receives the same income. We now take the “most 
efficient” individual - the one who has the highest coefficient, denoted by  1 α , next to 
his income - and give him marginally more income. He obtains a “boost” of utility (in 
marginal terms) of  1x α , since the coefficient next to income in his utility function is 
the highest in the population. To keep our “budget” balanced, we must take away this 
small portion of income x  from the other individual.  Since the latter  becomes 
relatively deprived and gets less income, his marginal loss is intuitively larger than 
the gain of the “richer” individual. If we increase the income of the more efficient 
individual (the one with the higher α  coefficient next to his income) by x then, as just 
noted, he gets a marginal boost of utility of  1 . x α  However, the individual who has the 
lower coefficient, denoted by  2 α , experiences a loss in terms of income equal to  2x α , 
plus a loss caused by  an increased  relative deprivation that is equal to 
2 2 22
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) 2 (1 )
2
RD x x x α αα − = −= − . In sum, we have a gain to the “richer” that 
is equal to  1xx α <  and a loss to the “poorer” that is equal to the full x. Therefore, our 
result is not due to us somehow assuming that “the marginal gain to a richer person is 
higher than the marginal loss felt by a poorer person.”   8 
3. Conclusion  
A concern for low relative income (relative deprivation) suffices to eliminate 
the discord between  the stands of  two schools of thought: utilitarianism, and 
egalitarianism; at the very same time, both get their exact way. Given the increasing 
recognition that unfavorable income comparisons impinge on individuals’ sense of 
wellbeing, a utility representation that admits this consideration suggests that a long-
prevailing tension in social choice and welfare economics is  resolved.  Our more 
comprehensive paper (Stark, Kobus, and Jakubek, 2011) reinforces this suggestion by 
expanding  the setting presented in  the current paper along several dimensions, 
according the result with a considerable degree of robustness. 
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